All modern drives have a key-erasing unblocking key sequence, there probably exists a secret, non-key-erasing unblocking key sequence for law enforcement use as well. SSDs usually encrypt all data to increase the efficiency of wear-levelling (to randomize data, not for security!), but you cannot rely that there is no way for law enforcement to recover the encryption key. You might be doing a "secure erase" and the complete data is still on the disk. Which means that you have little or no control about what data you actually overwrite when doing a secure erase. It does not matter so much whether it's possible, but whether you (or the data on your disk) are important enough to justify the expense.įurther, modern drives increasingly perform wear levelling (SSDs in particular do that for every single write). Admittedly, data density has increased a few orders of magnitude since then, and it is very likely that a 100% restoration will not be possible, but you must expect that a sufficient amount can be restored. That's something that has been done more or less routinely with black boxes since the 1970s. It is very well possible (and not hard, just expensive) to reconstruct data from magnetic store even after it has been overwritten a dozen times. At least, if whatever you may have on that disk is worth the effort. If you think of a secure wipe in terms of running some "secure erase h4xOr tool", then sorry, you're out of luck. ![]() The list of records can be exported to a text file by selecting 'Export to file.If you think of a secure wipe in terms of first formatting the drive, then opening the case, running a rare-earth magnet over the platters, working on them with a heavy hammer and a wrench for a couple of minutes, and finally dropping them into a camp fire, then no, police will not be able to recover the data. ![]() Rearranged due to changes to the $I30 attribute, and that the record found in the slack space is the previous, stale version. Note that the presence of a deleted file/folder record doesn't necessarily mean that it no longer exists in the directory it may just be that the record was Deleted records found in the slack space are highlighted in red. The list of $I30 index recordsĬan be viewed by opening an NTFS directory in the File System Browser with the internal viewer.Īfter switching to the 'Metadata View' tab, the list of $I30 index records are displayed. OSForensics is capable of displaying the index records stored in the $I30 attribute, including deleted records that were found in the slack space. This can be useful in forensics analysis for identifying files that However, re-arranging of the index records may leave remnants of the deleted file/folder entry within the slack space. ![]() When files or folders are removed from the directory, the $I30 index records are $I30 attribute that must be maintained whenever there are changes to the directory's contents. Every directory in the file system contains an The NTFS file system maintains an index of all files/directories that belong to a directory called the $I30 attribute. ![]() » How to scan NTFS $I30 (directory) entries for evidence of deleted files How to scan NTFS $I30 (directory) entries for evidence of deleted files
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